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Ravetta: Learned Intermediary Doctrine

NOTE
HOW MANY TIMES MUST THE
QUESTION BE ANSWERED? THE
APPLICATION OF THE LEARNED
INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE IN
THE NORPLANTCONTRACEPTIVE
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
1

The Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation
("Norplant Litigation") was lengthy and complex multidistrict
litigation involving the prescription Norplant Contraceptive
Device ("Norplant,,).2 Since the introduction of the first oral
contraceptives in the late 1960s, the first Intrauterine Devices
("IUDs") in the 1970s, and Norplant in the 1990s, women experienced various adverse side effects when using any of these
methods to prevent pregnancy.3 Many women who suffered
negative reactions brought lawsuits against the pharmaceuti-

1

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374 (5th
Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation 11"].
2

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700
(E.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation 1]. See also Norplant Litigation II,
165 F.3d at 374.
3

.

See generally MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.
1985); Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991); In
re AH. Robins Co. Inc., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 505 F.
Supp. 221 (J.P.M.L. 1981); Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1999).
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cal companies under products liability theories. The results of
the lawsuits varied depending on the jurisdictions in which the
6
they were filed and the types of injuries the women sustained.
Similarly, in the Norplant Litigation, the plaintiffs alleged
various side effects and claimed that the defendant did not
6
provide adequate warnings of the potential risks. The complaints against Norplant's manufacturer, Wyeth Laboratories,
and its parent company, American Home Products (collectively
"AHP") focused on twenty-six adverse reactions common to the
7
majority of the plaintiffs.
The primary issue presented in the Norplant Litigation was
the federal district court's decision to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' failure to warn claims
against AHP.B Since Norplant was a relatively new method of
contraception at the time of the litigation, the court had limited binding precedent to apply to the facts of the plaintiffs'
9
case. Therefore, the court looked to similar cases involving
prescription drugs and concluded that it should apply the
learned intermediary doctrine to all of the plaintiffs' claims. 10
As a result of this determination, the court held that the de-

4

See generally MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d 65; Reaves, 765 F. Supp. 1287; Dalkon
Shield, 505 F. Supp. 221; Perez, 734 A.2d 1245.
6

See generally MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d 65; Reaves, 765 F. Supp. 1287; Dalkon
Shield, 505 F. Supp. 221; Perez, 734 A.2d 1245.
6

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 702.

7 See Defendant's No.2 Memorandum in Support of Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment He Adequacy of the Norplant Labeling at 2, Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038).

8

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 702. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's failure to adequately warn of Norplant's side effects gave rise to liability
under numerous theories including: strict liability, negligence, misrepresentation,
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act ("DTPA"). See id. at 703.
9

See id. at 703. Since the federal district court's jurisdiction over the Norplant
Litigation was based on diversity of citizenship, the court applied Texas law to the
case. See id.
10 See id. at 704. The court looked to Texas court decisions ~nvolving prescription
drugs and the decisions of other states regarding the treatment of failure-to-warn
claims specifically involving prescription contraceptives since the Texas courts had
ruled on that issue See id. at n.18.
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fendant was insulated from liability to the plaintiffs for the
adverse reactions they experienced as a result of using N orplant. l1 Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment
12
in AHP's favor. On appeal, the United States Court of Ap13
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling.
Part II of this Note begins with a general discussion of failure to warn causes of action and the application of the learned
intermediary doctrine thereto. Further, Part II discusses cases
essential to understanding the background of the Norplant
Litigation. Next, Parts III and IV explain the facts and procedural history underlying the Norplant Litigation. Part V first
examines the federal district court's analysis of the case. It
then discusses the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the federal district court's summary judgment ruling in AHP's favor. Part VI
examines the federal district c\:mrt's pivotal decision to apply
the learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claims
against AHP, and the Fifth Circuit's decision to affirm this
ruling, thereby effectively ending the litigation. Further, Part
VI also notes that direct-to-consumer advertising creates a new
and unprecedented issue in failure to warn product liability
cases involving prescription drugs.
II. BACKGROUND
Norplant is comprised of synthetic hormones that prevent
pregnancy. 14 These hormones potentially cause adverse side
effects. 15 The Norplant Litigation began when women experiencing side effects sought to certify a nationwide class of persons who suffered or may suffer injury as a result of using
Norplant against the device's manufacturer, Wyeth Laborato-

11
12

13

See id. at 701.
See id.
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375.

14

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374, 376
(5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation 11"].
15

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700,
702 CE.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant ~itigation rJ.
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ries, Inc., and its parent company, American Home Products
(collectively "AHP,,).16 The plaintiffs claimed that AHP was
liable for failing to adequately warn them of the risks inherent
17
in Norplant use. Both the federal district court and the Fifth
Circuit applied the learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claims, thereby insulating AHP from liability for failing to
warn the ultimate consumer. IS An examination of the authority relied on by both courts in the Norplant Litigation illustrates the complexity and longevity of the central legal issue
presented in this litigation: the application of the learned intermediary doctrine and its continuing impact on a pharmaceutical manufacturer's liability for failing to directly warn
19
consumers of the risks associated with its products.
A. THE NORPLANT CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICE

In 1991, AHP introduced Norplant to the birth control mar20
ket after more than two decades of development and testing.
Norplant consists of six thin, match-stick size, silicone-coated,
capsules of synthetic progesterone, called levonorgestrel, in21
serted just below the skin of a woman's upper arm. Norplant
may remain in place for up to five years, and while implanted,
constantly releases a small, continuous dose of levonorgestrel

16 See ,d.
.
17
See id.

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 701. See also Norplant Litigation II,
165 F.3d at 375.
IS

19 See Norplant Litigati~n I, 955 F. Supp. at 704-705 (citing MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985); Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d
1264 (5th Cir. 1974)).

20 See Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 713 A.2d 588, 589 (N.J. Law Div. 1997).
The Population Council, a non-profit organization committed to the advancement of
reproductive health developed Norplant. The Population Council began development
of Norplant in 1966 and tested it on over 55,000 women in forty-four cou~tries over
the following two decades. The Population Council granted Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.
the exclusive right to market Norplant in the United States. See id.
n
. .
See Planned Parenthood FederatIon of AmerIca, Inc., Fact Sheet: Norplant and
You (1997). Levonorgestal is the term for synthetic progesterone hormone. See id.
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22
into the blood stream. Levonorgestrel prevents pregnancy by
keeping the ovaries from releasing eggs and thickens the cervical mucus, which impedes sperm from joining with an egg. 23 In
addition, some researchers believe that Norplant may also
prevent a fertilized egg from attaching to the lining of a
24
woman's uterus. Norplant is a highly effective contraceptive,
as demonstrated by statistics revealing-that of everyone hundred women who use the device for five years, fewer than four
25
will become pregnant.
Although Norplant is highly effective, women often experience various negative reactions due to the hormonal nature of
26
the device. A Norplant user's bloodstream carries the additionallevonorgestrel to the pituitary gland in the brain and to
the uterus and cervix.27 Due to the increased level of progesterone in a woman's body, she ml:l.Y experience side effects including, but not limited to, various combinations of severe
headaches, mood swings, depression, nausea, acne, arm pain,
numbness, breast tenderness, weight gain, hair loss, cramps,
28
and menstrual cycle irregularities. Physicians prescribing a
synthetic hormone-based contraceptive such as Norplant must
inform their patients that using the device to prevent preg29
nancy may include the risk of experiencing other side effects.

1. Failure to Warn Claims
The general rule regarding failure to warn claims is that
inadequate warnings by a pharmaceutical manufacturer render a product defective and may result in the manufacturer's

22 S ee I'd •
23
See id.
24
See id.
25 See I'd .
26
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 702.
27 See Planned Parenthood FederatIon
.
.
of Amenca, Inc., Fact Sheet:

Norplant and

You (1997).

28
.
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375.
29

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707.
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3o
liability for damages. A prima facie failure to warn claim requires a plaintiff to prove: first, that a manufacturer failed to
provide prescribing physicians and other healthcare providers
with adequate warnings and instructions regarding its product; and second, that this failure to warn directly caused the
plaintiff's injury.31
Therefore, warnings to physicians are adequate if the prescription drug manufacturer clearly conveys to the medical
community any risk that it knows or should know are associ32
ated with a particular drug. If warnings are deemed inadequate, a manufacturer may be liable directly to a patient for a
breach of its duty to warn of the risks inherent in using its
33
product. However, in most failure to warn cases, prescription
drug manufacturers are insulated from liability by the learned
. t erme d'lary doctnne.
. 34
In

2. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine
The learned intermediary doctrine insulates a prescription
drug manufacturer from the legal duty to warn consumers directly of a product's risk if it adequately warns prescribing
physicians. 35 This doctrine is based on the premise that physicians, who have an established and informed relationship with
patients, are ultimately responsible for prescribing the manu36
facturer's products. The foundation of the doctrine rests on
the assumption that physicians are significantly more capable
than the lay consumer of understanding the complex pharma-

30

31

See Restatement (Third) of Torts §6A (Proposed Final Draft 1997).

See id. The causation requirement in failure to warn claims is similar to the
proximate cause requirement for ordinary negligence claims. See id.
32 See Catherine A. Paytash, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Patient Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing Drug-Related Injury, 51 Stan. L. Rev.
1343, 1345 (1999).

33

See id.

3 4 .

.

Restatement (Third) of Torts §6A (Proposed Fmal Draft 1997).

35 Paytash, supra note 32 at 1345.
36

See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1967).
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cology of a drug as it relates to the medical history of a par37
ticular patient.
a. The Seminal Case: Sterling Drug Inc. v. Cornish
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
introduced the learned intermediary doctrine in Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Cornish 38 in 1966. 39 In Sterling, the plaintiff brought a
failure to warn claim against the manufacturer of the arthritis
40
drug Aralen. She claimed that the defendant manufacturer
failed to adequately warn her of the possible risks of taking the
drug. 41 As a result of taking Aralen for four years, the plaintiff developed a condition known as chloroquine retinopathy.42
This condition caused the plaintiff to suffer permanent vision
43
impairment.
In 1960, two years after the plaintiff began
taking the drug, the manufacturer distributed revised product
information cards to physicians, which included warnings that
44
Aralen may cause retinal damage. Further, as studies linking the drug to retinal damage became more definitive, the
manufacturer began sending letters to doctors to specifically
45
call attention to the potential side effects.
The question presented to the jury on appeal was whether
the defendant manufacturer provided adequate warnings of
the possible adverse side effects of Aralen to prescribing physicians, thereby making the doctors learned intermediaries be-

37

38
39
40

Paytash, supra note 32 at 1345.

See Sterling, 370 F.2d at 82.
See id. at 83.

See id. Aralen was used widely and effectively in the treatment of arthritis but
produced chloroquine retinopathy in a small percentage of users. See id.
41

See id.

42 See id.

43 See Sterling, 370 F.2d at 84. Chloroquine retinopathy is a degeneration or destruction of ertain cells in the retina of the eye caused by the chloroquine chemical in
Aralen. Chloroquine retinopathy often results in irreversible blindness. See id.
44
45

See id.
See id.
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46
The Eighth Circuit held that the
tween it and consumers.
trial court correctly concluded that reasonable men could disagree as to the adequacy of the defendant manufacturer's
47
warnings. Therefore, whether the defendant manufacturer or
pharmaceutical company provided adequate warnings to the
prescribing physicians was a question of fact for the jury.48
Thus, if the jury found that the defendant manufacturer provided adequate warnings to prescribing physicians, the learned
intermediary doctrine applied and, therefore, the pharmaceutical company was not liable to the plaintiff for failing to directly
49
warn her of the possible adverse side effects of its products.
b. Judicial History of Prescription Drug Products Liability
Litigation Involving the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Mter Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, courts in other United
States jurisdictions continued to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to failure to warn claims involving a variety of
prescription drugs. 50 As the doctrine expanded, courts began to
carve out exceptions to the doctrine. 51 These exceptions in-

46
See id. at 85.
47
See id.
48
See Sterling, 370 F.2d at 84.
49
See id. at 85.

50

See generally Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D.
Mich. 1991); Terhune v. AH. Robins Co., 90 Wash 2d 9 (1978); Spychala v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A2d
398 (Del. 1989); MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1991); Allen v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988); West v. Searle & Co., (304 Ark. 33 (1991); Martin
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 169 Ill.2d 234 (1996); Humes v. Clinton, 246 Kan. 590
(1990).
51

See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974). The Reyes court
created an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for mass vaccinations. See
id. See also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
The MacDonald court created an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for
prescription oral contraceptives. See id. See also Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,
734 A2d 1245 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999). The Perez court created an exception to the doctrine when the manufacturer of Norplant advertised the device directly to consumers.
See id.
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clude mass vaccinations, prescription contraceptives and direct-to-consumer advertising. 52
B. EXCEPTION FOR MAss VACCINATIONS

In Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,53 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a polio vaccine manufacturer had a duty to warn recipients directly of the possible
risks of its vaccine since it knew that physicians did not act as
54
learned intermediaries.
In Reyes, the plaintiffs infant
daughter contracted polio subsequent to receiving a few drops
55
of Sabin oral polio vaccine at a Texas county health clinic. A
registered nurse administered the vaccine to the infant without a doctor present. 56 The defendant manufacturer provided a
warning circular with each vial of the vaccine to warn doctors,
hospitals or other health care providers of the potential dan57
gers of ingesting the vaccine.
Although the nurse who administered the vaccine to the infant read the warning circular,
she testified that she did not warn Mrs. Reyes of the risks of
the vaccine since it was not the practice of the clinic nurses to
pass the manufacturer's warnings on to the patients and their
58
parents.

52

See Reyes, 498 F.2d 1264. See also MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d 65. See also Perez,
734 A. 2d 1245.
53
54

See Reyes, 498 F.2d 1264.
See id. at 1277.

55

See id. at 1270. As a result of the polio, Anita Reyes was completely paralyzed
from the waist down, her left arm became atrophied, and she was unable to control
her bladder or bowel movements. See id.
56
57

See id.
See id. Each vial contained 10 doses of the vaccine. See id.

58

See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1270. Mrs. Reyes testified that she was not warned of the
possible dangers of the polio vaccine. She had seventh grade education and spoke
primarily Spanish. She signed a form releasing the State of Texas for all liability in
connection with the vaccination which did not include any warning of potential risks of
the vaccine. The Court of Appeal concluded she either did not read the form or did not
have the linguistic ability to understand its significance. See id.
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The Reyes court determined that the defendant manufacturer knew that a great majority of its polio vaccines were administered in mass immunizations or at county health clinics
59
staffed, at least in part, by volunteers.
Further, the court
assumed that the defendant manufacturer knew that nonphysician medical professionals administered the drug in an
assembly line fashion, and thus did not dispense the vaccine in
the same manner as ordinary prescription drugs. 60 The court
emphasized that in such cases, the medical personnel dispensing the vaccine did not make individualized medical
judgments as to whether the vaccine was appropriate for par61
ticular patients. Therefore, in Reyes, a physician did not assume a learned intermediary role, since no physician actually
passed along manufacturer warnings to parents before admin62
istering the vaccine.
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held
that the defendant manufacturer had a duty to directly warn
vaccine recipients of the potential risks inherent in using its
63
pro duct.
C. EXCEPTION FOR ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES

In MacDonald u. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation,64 the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that manufacturers of oral
contraceptives owe a direct duty to consumers to warn of the
65
dangers inherent in the use its products. In MacDonald, the
plaintiff suffered a stroke that left her permanently disabled
after she used defendant's birth control pills for three years.66
Although MacDonald testified that she read all of the manu-

59 See id. at 1277. A witness for the defendant testified that it was common industry knowledge that county clinics were stocked primarily by sale of the vaccine to state
health departments. See id.

60 See td.
.
61 See td.
.
62 See Id.
.
63

64
65
66

See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277.
See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985).
See id. at 65.
See id. at 67.
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facturer's warnings and received limited warnings from her
physician, she maintained she was unaware that using oral
67
contraceptives increased her risk of suffering a stroke. Further, MacDonald claimed that she would not have used the
68
birth control pill had she known of this associated risk. The
MacDonald court agreed that the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to the plaintiffs claim, reasoning that
oral contraceptives bear particular characteristics that warrant imposing a duty upon the manufacturer to directly warn
69
users of associated risks.
These particular characteristics
include the patient's active participation in the selection of a
particular contraceptive method, the serious and substantial
risks inherent in the nature of oral contraceptives, and the
possibility of insufficient communication between patients and
70
physicians regarding the risks of the drug. Further, because
of the unique nature of oral contraceptives, manufacturers
cannot rely on solely doctors to provide patients with warnings
71
of the risks inherent in the use of their products. Thus, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that pharmaceutical companies must provide consumers with direct written warnings
72
of the potential risks of using oral contraceptives. In addition, manufacturers must advise consumers to see a physician

67

See id.

68

.

See Id. The plaintiff testified that her doctor warned her that the pills might
cause bloating, but made no mention of the risk of stroke. See id. at 68. Each pill
dispenser included a label with a warning that "oral contraceptives are powerful and
effective drugs, which can cause side effects in some users and should not be used by
some women" and that "the most serious known side effect is abnormal blood clotting
which can be fatal". See id. at 66. Ortho's information booklet, provided by MacDonald's gynecologist contained additional information about blood clots but, failed to
mention the word "stroke". The booklet included warnings that blood clots occasionally form in the blood vessels of the legs and pelvis of apparently healthy people and
may threaten life if the clots break loose and then lodge in the lung or if clots form in
other vital organs, such as the brain. Further, Ortho estimated that about one woman
in 2,000 on the pill each year suffers blood clotting severe enough to require hospitalization. See id. at 67.
69
70
71

See MacDonald, 475 N.E. 2d at 67.
See id. at 69.
.

See Id. at 70.
72 See id.
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for additional information regarding the risks inherent in the
use of oral contraceptives. 73
However, despite the willingness of the Massachusetts Supreme Court to create an exception to the learned intermediary
doctrine for prescription contraceptives, other courts are not
willing to go that far. 74 For example, in Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation,75 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan held that the manufacturer of
an oral contraceptive was not required to directly warn consumers of risks associated with the use of its product. 76 In
Reaves, the plaintiff used the defendant's Ortho-Novum 1150
77
oral contraceptive for almost 13 years.
Subsequently, the
78
plaintiff developed arterial thromboembolism in her leg. The
plaintiff stopped using the drug after her doctor advised her
79
that it was the likely cause of her condition. Due to complications caused by the condition, the plaintiffs leg was eventually
80
amputated just below her knee.
As a result, the plaintiff
sued the manufacturer for failing to warn her of the potential
81
side effects of the oral contraceptive. Relying on MacDonald,
the plaintiff argued that because of the particular characteristics of oral contraceptives, the defendant manufacturer had a
duty to directly warn her of the risks inherent in using its
82
pro d uct.

73 See id. The warnings must include notice of the nature, gravity and likelihood of
known or knowable side effects. See id.

74

See MacDonald, 475 N.E. 2d at 70.

75 See Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
76

See id. at 129l.

77 See id. at 1288. The plaintiff used an oral contraceptive manufactured by the defendant almost continuously from 1973 to 1986. A physician typically refilled her
prescription for six months to one year without medical evaluation. See id.

78

79

80

81
82

See id.
See id. Arterial thromboemolism is a blood clotting disorder. See id.
See Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1288.
See id.
See id.
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Since the federal district court did not have any precedent
to apply in this case, the court held an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the learned intermediary doctrine applied
83
to oral contraceptives. At the hearing, the defendant called a
distinguished physician to support its argument that the
learned intermediary doctrine should apply to the plaintiffs
84
failure to warn claim. The witness testified that a physician's
participation in prescribing oral contraceptives is active since
it is common practice to examine a patient prior to prescribing
the drug to determine if she is likely to be a successful user of
85
In addition, the defendant's witness
oral contraceptives.
stated that physicians typically evaluate a patient's personal
and family medical history to determine potential risk
86
factors. Further, physicians perform a physical examination
and perform certain tests to ascertain any preexisting conditions that may preclude successful use, and counsel patients as
to the side effects, risks and benefits of using oral contraceptives. 87 The physician concluded by stating that oral contraceptives are the same as any other prescription drug in that
patients are unlikely to understand the technical medical information regarding the nature of the drug. 88
In response, the plaintiff called an expert witness to support her argument that the learned intermediary doctrine
89
should not apply to her failure to warn claim. The plaintiffs
physician witness testified that manufacturers are in the best
position to know the potential risks of its products and thus
9o
are best able to warn patients. However, based on the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the federal district
court disagreed with the plaintiffs argument that the learned
83
84
85

86

87
88
89
90

See id. at 1290.
See id.
See Reaves,765 F. Supp. at 1290.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1291.
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intermediary doctrine should not apply to her claim, and held
that oral contraceptives are indistinguishable from other pre91
scription drugs. Thus, since physicians play an active role in
prescribing prescription contraceptives, the Reaves court declined to follow MacDonald's exception to the doctrine. 92 Instead, the court held that the defendant manufacturer was not
liable to plaintiff for failing to warn her directly of the risks
93
associated with the use of its product.
D. EXCEPTION FOR DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING

Although the issue of direct-to-consumer advertising was
not directly addressed in the Norplant Litigation,94 the New
Jersey Supreme Court faced the issue in a later case against
AHP regarding Norplant. 95 In 1999, in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,96 the New Jersey Supreme Court created an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine in failure to warn
claims when the defendant manufacturer engaged in direct-toconsumer advertising. 97 In Perez, the plaintiffs argued that the
learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to their failure
to warn claim against AHP because the advertisement warnings were inadequate. 98 The defendant manufacturer, Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc. (''Wyeth"), advertised Norplant in women's
magazines
such
as
Glamour,
Mademoiselle
and
99
Cosmopolitan. These advertisements praised the simplicity

91

See id.

92See,'d .
93

See id.

94 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 708. The plaintiffs claimed that the
learned intermediary doctrine does not apply when a manufacturer directly advertising its products to consumers. The Federal District Court did not address this issue
because the plaintiffs admitted they did not see any of AHP's advertisements before
the implantation with Norplant. See id.
95

See Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999).

96 See,'d.
97
98

99

.

See ,d. at 1245.
See id. at 1248.
.

See ,d.
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and convenience of N orplant as a birth control method, but
failed to mention the dangers inherent in using the actual device. 100 The plaintiffs claimed Norplant caused them to suffer
adverse side effects, including weight gain, headaches, dizziness, nausea, diarrhea, acne, vomiting, fatigue, facial hair
growth, numbness in the arms and legs, irregular menstruation, hair loss, leg cramps, anxiety, vision problems, anemia,
mood swings and depression, high blood pressure and removal
complications that resulted in scarring. 101
Wyeth argued that the learned intermediary doctrine
should apply to the plaintiffs' failure to warn claim despite its
direct-to-consumer marketing campaign.102 The trial court and
the appellate division both ruled that the learned intermediary
doctrine applied to the plaintiffs' claim because the plaintiffs
failed to show that the manufacturer's provided inadequate
103
warnings to the prescribing physicians. Despite the fact that
the plaintiffs conceded that they were not influenced by the
defendant's advertisements, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the decisions of the lower courts, concluding that the consumer-directed advertising of pharmaceuticals undermines the foundational premises of the learned
104
intermediary doctrine.
The court discussed several rationales to support its conclusion. lOS First, Wyeth's direct-toconsumer advertising of Norplant demonstrated that consum106
ers participated directly in their health care decisions.
This
patient participation invalidates the premise that it is the physician, rather than the patient, who decides which contracep107
tive method to use. In addition, the court found it illogical to
conclude that requiring manufacturers to provide direct
100
See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1248.
101
See id.
102
See id. at 1260.
103
See id. at 1249
104
See id. at 1256.

105

See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256.

106
See id.
107 See id.
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warnings to a consumer will undermine the patient-physician
relationship. lOB The court held that by its very nature, consumer-directed advertising encroaches on the patientphysician relationship by encouraging patients to ask for prod109
ucts by name.
Next, the court noted that consumer-directed
advertising rebuts the notion that prescription drugs and devices and their potential adverse effects are too complex to be
effectively communicated to consumers.uo Finally, the court
concluded that since the Federal Drug Administration ("FDA")
requires prescription drugs and devices to carry warnings, the
consumer may reasonably presume that the advertiser guaran111
tees the adequacy of its warnings.
Thus, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the learned intermediary doctrine
should not apply to the plaintiffs claim against AHP.112

III. FACTS UNDERLYING THE NORPLANT CONTRACEPTIVE
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

In 1995, the Norplant plaintiffs sought class certification,
alleging that AHP failed to provide adequate warnings con113
cerning the possible side effects from using Norplant. Collectively, the various plaintiffs attributed over 950 different side

lOB
109
110

111

See id,
See id.
See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256

See I'd •

112 See I'd,
113

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1038, 1996
WL 264731 at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 17,1996)
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114

effects to their use of the device.
However, the majority of
the plaintiffs complained of twenty-six adverse reactions. 115
Prior to prescribing Norplant, the plaintiffs' prescribing
physicians received informational brochures and package inserts directly from AHP, which warned of the possible risks of
using Norplant. 116 Specifically, AHP listed the twenty-six adll7
verse reactions alleged by the plaintiffs. AHP listed the risk
of irregular menstrual bleeding, the most common side effect
118
alleged by the plaintiffs, first in its warning materials.
Specifically, AHP warned the prescribing physicians that 27.6% of
women using Norplant may experience many bleeding days or
prolonged bleeding during the first year of use. 119

114 See Defendant's No.2 Memorandum in Support of Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment Re Adequacy of the Norplant Labeling at 1, In re Norplant Contraceptive
Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038).. The
plaintiffs attributed over 950 conditions to the use of Norplant including, but not limited to: body odor, drug addition, evil thoughts, change in finger nail color, loss of
logical reasoning, stretch marks, tapeworms, toothache and tuberculosis. See id.
115

See id. at 2. Nearly all of the 30,000 plaintiffs complained of irregular menstrual bleeding. The 26 core conditions included: bleeding irregularities including
prolonged bleeding, spotting, amenorrhea (absence of menstruation), irregular onset of
bleeding, frequent bleeding onsets, and scanty bleeding, infection at implant site, pain
or itching at implant site, removal difficulties, headaches, nervousness, nausea, dizziness, adnexal enlargement, dermatitis (inflammation of the skin), acne, change in
appetite, mastalgia (breast swelling and tenderness), weight gain, hair loss and hair
growth, breast discharge, crevicitis (inflammation of the neck of the cervix), musculoskeletal pain, abdominal discomfort, leukorrhea (a white, thick vaginal discharge) and
vaginitis (vaginal infection). See id.
116 See id. at 3. The warning information provided by AHP included all of the 26
core adverse reactions, together with statistics as to how often the side effects occurred during controlled clinical studies involving Norplant. See id.
117
118

See id. at 3.
See id. at 12.

119

See Defendant's No.2 Memorandum in Support of Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment Re Adequacy of the Norplant Labeling at 3, In re Norplant Contraceptive
Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038). AHP
emphasized the possibility of irregular menstrual bleeding because the Norplant clinical trials revealed that irregular menstrual bleeding was the most common reason for
women discontinuing the use of the device. See id.
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IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 6, 1994, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation 120 assigned all pending federal claims against AHP
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas, Beaumont Division as Multidistrict Litigation 1038
("MDL 1038") for consolidated and coordinated discovery and
121
pretrial proceedings.
After the initial consolidation in the
Eastern District of Texas, four hundred additional cases were
122
also added to MDL 1038. During the coordination of the pretrial proceedings, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification on behalf of all women in the United States who experi123
enced problems associated with their use of Norplant.
On May 17, 1996, the federal district court stayed the plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification pending the Fifth Circuit's

120 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(d) Section 1407(d) states: The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation shall consist of seven circuit and district judges designated from
time to time by the Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from
the same circuit. The concurrence of four members shall be necessary to any action by
the panel. See id.

121

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 878 F. Supp.
972, 973 (E.D. Tex. 1995). See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(a). Section 1407(a) specifically
states: When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation authorized by this section upon its determination
that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated. See id.
122 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1038, 1996
WL 264731 at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 17,1996).
123

.

See id. Plaintiffs filed 'their Motion for Class Certification on March 9, 1995.
See id. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a) outlines the prerequisites for a class
action lawsuit: One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. See id.
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decision in Castano v. American Tobacco Company,124 concerning the necessary court procedures prior to granting class
certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("FRCP,,).125 Following Castano, the federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, and in126
stead held that it would first conduct bellwether trials to determine the appropriateness of class certification for the Norplant Litigation plaintiffs.127 Upon the completion of the bellwether trials, the plaintiffs could refile their Class Certification Motion. 128

124

See Castano v. American Tobacco Company, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that individual trials are necessary prior to applying the predominance test under Rule 23(b)(3) of the FRCP. Individual trials are
necessary so as to allow the court to make an informed decision regarding whether
common issues predominate and whether class certification is superior to other methods for handling the litigation. See id.

125 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1038, 1996
WL 264731 at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 17,1996). The Federal District Court knew that the
Fifth Circuit was considering many class certification issues similar to those presented
in the Norplant litigation in Castano v. American Tobacco Company. See also Castano, 84 F.3d at 734. Specifically, Castano addressed issues related to the viability of
a nationwide class in a products liability case in the Fifth Circuit, and the proper
method for applying the predominance test under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See id at 750. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) is called
into question if the prerequisites to a class action are met as set forth in 23(a) and the
provisions of 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) are also satisfied. Following Rule 23(b)(3), an action
may be maintained as a class action if: the court finds that questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is super to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. See id.
126

See In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997). The term
bellwether derives from the ancient practice of belling a wether (a male sheep) selected to lead his flock. The ultimate success of the wether selected to wear the bell
was determined by the confidence of the flock that the wether would not lead them
astray. The same notion applies to the class action concept. A bellwether trial helps
the court to determine if the claims tried are representative of a larger group of claims
from which they are selected. The bellwether trial is meant to permit the court to
reach a sufficient level of confidence that the results obtained in the bellwether trial
would be obtained from trial involving the whole class. See id.

127

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 577,
578 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Castano, 84 F.3d at 734).

128

See id.
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The federal district court determined that in the interest of
fairness and to comply with FRCP 23(c)(1),129 which mandates
that decisions regarding class certification be made as soon as
practicable, the bellwether trials should take priority over the
13o
court's other business.
On October 28, 1996, Chief Judge
Richard A. Schell issued an Order Regarding Selection of
Plaintiffs for Trial. l3l In the Order, Judge Schell selected three
groups, each consisting of five plaintiffs, for the bellwether tri132
The court schedals scheduled to take place during 1997.
uled the first group for trial commencing on February 24,
133
The additional two groups would follow at later
1997.
dates. 134
AHP filed a Motion for Summary Judgment before the
commencement of the first bellwether trial. 135 The defendant
argued that the learned intermediary doctrine insulated it
from liability to the plaintiffs for failing to warn of the risks of
Norplant use because it provided adequate warnings to pre136
Subsequent to the defendant's motion,
scribing physicians.
the federal district court issued its Preliminary Order on Application of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine as it Pertains

129 See Norplant Litigation, 168 F.R.D. at 579. FRCP 23(c)(1) requires a decision
regarding class certification to be made as soon as practicable. See id. See also Fed.
R. Civ. P. (23)(c)(1). Rule 23(c)(1) states:
As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be
so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional,
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits. [d.
130

See Norplant Litigation, 168 F.R.D. at 578.

131 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1038, 1996
WL 631727, at *1 (E.D. Tex. October 28,1996).

132 See £d.
.
133 See id.
134
See id.

135 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp.
700, 702 (E.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation n.

136

See id.
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to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Order,,).137
This Order advised the parties that based on the weight of the
authorities in Texas, the federal district court would apply the
learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claims. 138
In response, the plaintiffs argued that the learned interme139
diary doctrine should not apply to their claims against AHP.
Specifically, they maintained that prescription contraceptives
such as Norplant are unlike other prescription drugs because
physicians do not stand as learned intermediaries between
consumers and the device's manufacturer. 14o Further, they
argued that AHP's actions displaced those physicians as
learned intermediaries. 141 These actions included engaging in
direct-to-consumer advertising, and distributing informational
and promotional materials to patients through prescribing
physicians. 142 The federal district court disagreed with the
plaintiffs' arguments and consequently granted AHP's Motion
143
for Summary Judgment.
The plaintiffs appealed the federal district court's ruling to
the Fifth Circuit, again claiming that the learned intermediary
doctrine should not apply to all of their claims against AHP. 144
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to its claims for misrepresentation and its statutory claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade

137

See id. The Federal District Court issued its Preliminary Order on Application
of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine as it Pertains to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on February 20,1997. See id.
138 See id. Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive laws of the state in which they are located. In cases involving a drug manufacturer's duty to warn, Texas courts apply the learned intermediary doctrine. See id. at
70l.

139
140

See id.
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 704.

141
See id. at 705.
142
See id. at 707-708.
143
See id. at 702.
144

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374,
375 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation II"]
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Practices Act ("DTPA,,).145 Further, the plaintiffs argued the
defendant's direct-to-consumer marketing campaign demonstrated that by providing information directly to consumers, it
assumed a duty to warn consumers directly of its products
. k 146
TIS S.
In response, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs' DTPA
claims were also based on its failure to warn of the risks associated with Norplant, and that the learned intermediary doctrine should continue to apply.147 In addition, the defendant
argued that the plaintiffs' argument concerning their advertising campaign was irrelevant because the plaintiffs admitted
that they had not seen the advertisements prior to using Norplant. 148 After hearing the parties' arguments, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's decision to apply the
doctrine to all of the plaintiffs' claims. 149
Despite the Fifth Circuit's ruling in its favor, AHP recently
agreed to pay over fifty million dollars to settle the claims of
former Norplant users pending in other United States jurisdictions in order to end time-consuming and expensive
litigation. 150 As a result, on September 23, 1999, the federal
district court issued an order establishing a schedule for nonsettling plaintiffs to respond to four motions filed by AHP in
151
May, 1999.
In November, 1999, the parties asked the court
to extend the deadlines for submitting responses since the
identities of the settling plaintiffs will not be known until

145
See id. at 377.
146
See id. at 379.
147
See id. at 378.
148
See id. at 379.
149

See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
denied a rehearing of the January 1999 decision on March 9,1999. See id.

150

See Charles Orstein, Norplant company agrees to settle suits, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6, 1999. Each claimant who filed suit before March 1, 1999
will receive a cash payment of $1,500, and attorney's fees will be deducted from each
woman's settlement. See id.
151 See Order Establishing Schedule for Responses of Non-Settling Plaintiffs, In re
Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MD 1038.
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March 31, 2000, due to the time permitted under the settle152
ment agreement.
The court agreed to the extension and ordered that the plaintiffs file their responses no later than May
153
15, 2000.
Thus, the plaintiffs' response to the defendant's
motions are not available at the time of this writing. 1M

V. COURTS' ANALYSIS
The Norplant Litigation plaintiffs argued against the application of the learned intermediary doctrine to their failure to
warn claims against AHP, citing authorities from various
United States jurisdictions which created exceptions to the
155
doctrine's application.
Since the plaintiffs were unable to
convince the federal district court, the doctrine ultimately ap156
plied to their failure to warn claims against AHP.
Conse157
quently, the plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
On appeal, the plaintiffs again failed to convince the court that the
learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to their failure
158
to warn claims involving Norplant.

A. DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
In response to AHP's motion, the plaintiffs argued that the
learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to their various
159
First, the plainclaims against the defendant manufacturer.
tiffs argued that a special exception to the doctrine should ap152

See id.

153

See id.
1M See id.
155 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp.
700, 704-705 (E.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation r} (citing MacDonald
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974)).
156

See Norplant Litigation [, 955 F. Supp. at 709.

157
158

See Norplant Litigation, 165 F.3d at 374.
See id. at 375.

159

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp.
700, 705 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation [r}..
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ply to failure to warn claims since it involves a prescription
contraceptive. 160 Next, the plaintiffs argued that AHP's actions, including distributing brochures through physicians and
engaging in direct-to-consumer advertising, effectively dis::'
placed physicians as learned intermediaries, rendering the ap16l
plication of the doctrine improper.
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that even if the learned intermediary doctrine applied to
their claims based on failure to warn, it should not apply to
their claims for misrepresentation and violations of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA,,).162

1. Should the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Apply to Failure
to Warn Claims Involving Prescription Contraceptives?
The plaintiffs failed to convince the federal district court
that it should create a special exception to the learned inter~
163
mediary doctrine for prescription contraceptives. They relied
principally on MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.l64 to
support their contention that prescription contraceptives bear
particular characteristics that warrant imposing a duty on
drug manufacturers to directly warn consumers of associated
165
risks.
The plaintiffs argued that prescribing physicians are
relegated to a passive role when a woman makes the ultimate
decision to select Norplant as her contraceptive method, and
therefore, manufacturers are in a better position than physicians to directly warn consumers of the risks inherent in using

160

161
162

See id. at 706.
See id. at 705-708.
See id. at 709.

163
See id. at 707.
164
See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E. 2d 65 (1985).
165

See Norplant Litigation 1, 955 F. Supp. at 706 (citing MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at
65). According to MacDonald, these peculiar characteristics include patient's active
involvement in making the decision to use prescription contraceptives, the substantial
risks associated with using the drug, the feasibility of direct warnings by the manufac:
turer to the user, the limited participation of the physician (annual prescription), and
the possibility that communications between the physician and patient may be too
scanty standing alone to fully warn patients of the risks. See id.
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166

its product.
In response, the court found that physicians
consistently advise patients of the various advantages and disadvantages of prescription contraceptives even though the
167
drugs are elective.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, reasoning that the fact that the patient makes the final
decision as to which contraceptive method to use does not ren16s
der the doctrine inapplicable.
The federal district court concluded that the learned intermediary doctrine applies to failure to warn claims regarding prescription contraceptives
whenever physician is involved, a relationship that is inher169
ent in the surgical nature of Norplant.

a

2. Did the Defendant's Conduct Result in the Displacement of
the Prescribing Physician?
170

Next, the plaintiffs relied on Reyes u. Wyeth Laboratories
to support their argument that the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to Norplant because AHP's distribution
of informational materials through prescribing physicians abrogated the physicians' roles as learned intermediaries. l7l In
Reyes, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer was not insulated from liability for the adverse side effects of its polio vaccine because a .
172
physician did not assume a learned intermediary role.
Rather, a nurse dispensed the polio vaccine to children and a
physician did not confer with parents about the possible side
effects of the vaccine. 173 The federal district court distin-

166 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 706. In the twelve years following the
MacDonald decision, no other United States jurisdiction followed the Massachusetts
Supreme Court ruling. See id.

167
16S
169

See id. at 707.
.

See ld.
See id.

170

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 705 (citing Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974)).
171
172
173

See id.
See id.
See id.
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guished Reyes, where the learned intermediary doctrine was
inapplicable because the physician-patient relationship was
non-existent. 174 In contrast, the physicians in the Norplant
Litigation were clearly involved in the prescribing and im175
planting of Norplant.
The court elaborated further, holding
that although AHP provided physicians with a Norplant Patient Brochure to review with their patients, this brochure did
not abrogate the patient-physician relationship.176 Instead, the
brochure reinforced the existence of that relationship by encouraging patients to discuss the contents of the brochure with
177
a doctor before deciding to use Norplant. The federal district
court concluded that, as was the case in Reyes, only a doctor
can remove himself from the role of learned intermediary.17s
The information AHP provided to physicians clearly did not
creat e such SI'tuat'IOn. 179

3. Did the Marketing Campaign Impose a Direct Duty on AHP
to Warn Norplant Users of Possible Adverse Side Effects?
The federal district court did not resolve whether AHP's direct-to-consumer advertising campaign created an exception to
the learned intermediary doctrine. ISO The plaintiffs argued
that AHP had a duty to directly warn consumers of both the
benefits and possible risks of its product since it elected to bypass physicians by advertising products directly to
consumers. lSI However, although AHP printed several "puff
pieces" in consumer magazines that did not include warnings
of side effects, the plaintiffs admitted that they had not seen
1s2
any of the advertisements before using Norplant.
The fed174
See id.
175 See Norplant L,t,gatwn
.. . I, 955 F. Supp. at 705.
176
See id.

177 See id. at 706.
178 See ,d.
. at 706.
179 S ee''d.
ISO
lSI

1S2

..

.

See Norplant La'gatwn I, 955 F. Supp. at 708.
See id. at 707-708.
See id.
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eral district court determined that on this basis, the plaintiffs'
argument concerning AHP's direct marketing efforts was with. 183
out ment.

4. Did Defendant's Distribution of Promotional Materials
Through a Physician Displace the Learned Intermediary Doctrine?
The federal district court ruled that AHP's efforts to distribute promotional materials to consumers through physicians
did not displace the physicians as learned intermediaries. 184
AHP provided promotional videotapes and pamphlets to physicians "disguised" as·objective and factual patient informational
185
brochures.
The plaintiffs argued that these promotional materials were deceptive because they highlighted the benefits of
186
Norplant, but not the potential side effects.
Further, the
plaintiffs argued that since their decisions to use Norplant
were made after reviewing these deceptive materials, physicians did not act as learned intermediaries. 187 Therefore, AHP
assumed a duty to. directly warn consumers of its product's
risks. 188 The court disagreed and instead concluded that the
promotional materials merely facilitated communication be189
tween physicians and patients.
AHP's distribution of these
materials did not reflect a voluntarily assumption of a duty to
19o
directly warn patients of Norplant's potential side effects.
Since AHP dIstributed the materials to physicians, as learned
intermediaries, they have a duty to review materials to ensure
that the materials provide accurate information before passing
19l
them on to patients.
Thus, the court declined to conclude

183

See Norplant Litigation, 955 F. Supp. at 708.

184

See id. at 708-709.

185

See id. at 708.

186
187
188
189

190
191

See id.
See id.
See Norplant Litigation, 955 F. Supp. at 708.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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that the promotional materials distributed by AHP displaced
192
the role of prescribing physicians as learned intermediaries.

5. Does the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Apply to Each of the
Plaintiffs' Claims?
The federal district court determined that failure to warn
was the foundation for all of the plaintiffs' claims against
193
AHP.
As a result, the learned intermediary doctrine applied
to all the claims. 194 Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, the
195
plaintiffs were required to satisfy a two-prong test.
The first
prong required the plaintiffs to prove that AHP's warnings to
prescribing physicians failed to adequately warn of the side
196
To satisfy the second prong,
effects they each experienced.
the plaintiffs had to prove that but for the inadequacies of
AHP's warnings, their treating physicians would not have pre197
scribed Norplant to them.
AHP argued that the plaintiffs could not avoid summary
judgment since the court did not need to reach the first-prong
issue concerning the adequacy of its warnings to physicians
19B
because the plaintiffs could not satisfy the second prong.
Rather, the undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiffs'
physicians were fully aware of the alleged potential side effects
199
and their severity before prescribing Norplant.
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that their physicians would not
have prescribed Norplant if they had received additional information contained in studies, internal AHP memoranda and

192
193

See id. at 709.
..

.

See Norplant Lltlgatwn 1, 955 F. Supp. at 709.

194

See id. The plaintiffs alleged a number of causes of action including strict liabiiity, negligence, misrepresentation, implied warranty and a claim under the DTPA.
See id.
195 See id.
196
197

19B
199

See id.
See id.
See Norplant Litigation 1, 955 F. Supp. at 710.
See id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss2/5

28

Ravetta: Learned Intermediary Doctrine

2000]

LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE

.359

20o
letters unavailable to the physicians.
At trial, all of the
plaintiffs' prescribing physicians testified that none of the additional information would have changed their minds about
201
prescribing Norplant to the plaintiffs.
Since the plaintiffs
were unable to prove that AHP's warnings were inadequate,
the plaintiffs were not able to satisfy the second-prong of the
202
two-prong test.
Thus the federal district court did not need
203
to reach the second prong causation question.
As a last resort, the plaintiffs argued that their claims for
misrepresentation and violations of the DTPA were not actually based on failure to warn, and therefore, the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply.204 Further, the plaintiffs
claimed that they should
be able to sue AHP directly on these
.
.
two theories because AHP voluntarily distributed deceptive
205
and misleading patient information materials to physiciaris.
The federal district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and
ruled that the alleged misrepresentation or the allegedly false,
misleading and deceptive nature of these materials was· not
that the information was inaccurate, but rather that AHP
206
Thus,
failed to adequately warn of Norplant's side eifects.
the court concluded that failure to warn was definitely the ba207
sis of all of the plaintiffs' various claims against AHP.

6. The District Court's Conclusion
The court concluded that prescription contraceptives should
be treated the same as any other prescription drug regarding
the application of .the learned intermediary doctrine as a
pharmaceutical manufacturer's defense to failure to warn
200
See id.
201
See id. at 710-711.
202 See Norplant LItIgatIOn
.. . I, 955 F. Supp. at 711.
203
See id.
204
See id.
205
See id. at 709.
206
See id.

207 Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 709.
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208
claims.
Although the plaintiffs argued that AHP's efforts to
distribute product information brochures to consumers
through physicians displaced the medical professionals as
learned intermediaries, the court did not find the argument
209
compelling.
In addition, the applicability of the learned intermediary doctrine when manufacturers engage in direct-toconsumer advertising remains unanswered by the Norplant
Litigation. 210 Further, AHP's efforts to distribute promotional
materials through prescribing physicians did not render the
doctrine inapplicable since the court found that these materials actually facilitated dialogues. between physicians and patients.2l1 Finally, the court concluded that failure to warn was
the basis of each of the plaintiffs' claims against AHP.212 Thus
the learned intermediary doctrine protected the defendant
213
from liability on all counts.
As a result of its findings, the
federal district court granted AHP's Summary Judgment Motion, despite the plaintiffs many arguments against applying
214
the learned intermediary doctrine.
B. PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the federal district
court erred in granting AHP's Motion for Summary
215
Judgment.
Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the
court erred by applying the learned intermediary doctrine to
their DTPA claim against AHP. 216 Further, the plaintiffs argued that because AHP's direct-to-consumer advertising cam-

208

See id. at 707.

209
See id. at 706.
210
See id. at 708.

211

See id. at 708 ..

212
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 709.
213
See id.
214
See id. at 711.
215
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 376.
216
See id. at 377.
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paign abrogated the role of their prescribing physicians, it assumed a duty to directly warn consumers of Norplant's inher217
ent risks.
Finally, the plaintiffs introduced a new theory for
imposing liability on AHP by arguing that the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply when the Federal Drug
Administration recommends manufacturer warnings for a par218
ticular drug.
The Fifth Circuit ultimately disagreed, affirming the federal district court's decision to grant summary
219
judgment in favor of AHP.
1. Should the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Apply to the

Plaintiffs' Claims Under the DTPA?
The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to their claim
under the DTPA. 220 The plaintiffs claim relied specifically on
DTPA Section 17.46(b), which makes it unlawful to misrepre221
sent the nature of goods sold in Texas. The plaintiffs alleged
that AHP violated the DTPA by representing that Norplant
had certain attributes that it does not,222 and representing that
Norplant was of a particular standard or quality when it was
223
not.
Moreover, the Norplant Litigation plaintiffs claimed
that AHP violated Section 17.46(b)(23) of the DTPA, which
makes it unlawful for manufacturers to fail to disclose information it knows at the time of the transaction that, if disclosed, would cause the consumer not to enter into the transac217
See id.
218
See id.
219
See id. at 380.
220 See Norplant Lltlgatzon
.. . II,

165 F.3d at 377. The Federal District Court did not
address the issue because the court concluded that the DTPA claim was equivalent to
the other common law claims and therefore the learned intermediary doctrine applied.

221

See id. Section 17.46(b) of the DTPA makes it unlawful to misrepresent that
goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have. See id.

222 .
See id.
223

See id. See also Texas Business and Commerce Code, Chapter 17 § 17.46(b)(7)
(1967). Section 17.46(b)(7) prohibits representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if
they are of another.
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tion: 224 When the defendant engages in the false, misleading or
deceptive practices specifically set forth in subsection 17.46(b),
a Texas consumer may maintain an action for economic or
mental anguish damages. 225 The Norplant Litigation plaintiffs
claimed to have a cause of action under the DTPA for AHP's
deceptive practices, without the burden of proof requirements
and common law defenses normally applicable to common law
226
.
.
calms.
I
The plaintiffs contended that the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to their statutory DTPA claims because
227
it is a defense to common law failure to warn claims. Therefore J the doctrine does not apply to a statutory DTPA claim. 228
AHP responded by arguing that the learned intermediary doctrine is not actually a defense, but rather a rule of law defining
a pharmaceutical manufacturer's duty to provide adequate
229
warnings to prescribing physicians regarding its product.
The court found evidence to support AHP's argument, as lower
Texas courts applied the doctrine to :QTPA claims in the
230
past. On the basis of these Texas decisions, the Fifth Circuit

224

. See Texas Business and Commerce Code, Chapter 17 § 17.46(b)(23) (1967). Section 17.46(b)(23) prohibits failing to disclose information concerning goods or services
which was known at the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed.
225

.

See Texas Business and Commerce Code, Chapter 17 § 17.50 (1967). In order to
recover damages under the DTPA, consumers must also show that they relied on the
false, misleading or deceptive practice to their detriment.
226 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 377 (citing Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.
2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980».
227
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 377.
228

,

See id. The plaintiffs argued that the DTPA is not a codification of the common
law. Rather, its purpose is to provide consumers with a cause of action for deceptive
practices without the burden of proof and defenses encountered in a common law
fraud or breach of warranty suit. See id.
229

See id. at 378.

230

..

See id. (citing Rivers v. American Home Products Corp., No. 342-160538-95
dated April 9, 1998.». In Rivers, a lower Texas state court applied the learned intermediiuy doctrine in the context of a Norplant claim under the DTPA.
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held that the learned intermediary doctrine also applied to the
231
plaintiffs' DTPA claim.

2. Do Public Policy Considerations Require Imposing a Duty to
Warn?
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that AHP should have
a duty to directly warn consumers of the risks inherent in
Norplant use because physicians playa reduced role in select232
ing the contraceptive for their patients.
The court concluded
that although patients participate with physicians in their contraceptive choices, Norplant is nevertheless a prescription
233
drug.
The court found the plaintiffs' argument unpersuasive
since the record clearly established that physicians played a
significant role in prescribing Norplant and educating patients
234
about the risks and benefits of the device.

3. Did AHP's Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Norplant Impose a Duty to Directly Warn Consumers?
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument
that AHP's direct-to-consumer marketing efforts displaced
235
their prescribing physicians as learned intermediaries.
The
plaintiffs claimed that since AHP engaged in aggressive marketing of Norplant, it should be held liable for failing to pro236
vide adequate warnings in conjunction with that marketing.
The court held that even if an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine applied in this case, summary judgment was
proper because the plaintiffs never saw any of AHP's N orplant
237
advertisements before implantation.
Additionally, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that even if the plaintiffs had seen the adver-

231
232
233
234
235
236
237

See id.
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d 374 at 379.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379.
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tisements, their argument would still fail because two courts,
applying Texas law, concluded that the learned intermediary
doctrine applies as long a physician-patient relationship
. t s. 238
eXls

4. Does the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Continue to Apply
Even When the Federal Drug Administration Recommends
Manufacturer Warnings?
.
The plaintiffs further argued that the warnings on Norplant
packaging recommended by the FDA created an exception to
239
the learned intermediary doctrine.
Citing an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision, the plaintiffs contended that when potential side effects of prescription drugs are so serious that the
FDA requires warnings, the doctrine should not apply.240 The
Fifth Circuit called this rationale "counter-intuitive" because
one reason for the learned intermediary doctrine is to encourage pharmaceutical companies to make drugs available to con241
sumers.
Despite the potentially harmful side effects of certain products, pharmaceutical manufacturers are shielded
from liability when the drug is prescribed by a properly trained
242
physician.
Further, the court found that it had no reason to
believe that Texas would be inclined to follow Oklahoma's exception to the learned intermediary doctrine in this
243
situation.
Finally, the court noted that the FDA has explicitly stated that labeling requirements should not affect civil
tort liability.244 Ultimately, the court found the plaintiffs' ar-

238 See id. (citing Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988);
Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987».

239 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379.
240 See id. (citing Basel v. Edwards Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997».
241
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379.
242
See id.
243
See id.
244 See id.
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gument unpersuasive since the FDA did not actually mandate
any particular labeling for Norplant. 245

5. The Fifth Circuit's Conclusion
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's granting of
246
AHP's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The court held that
the learned intermediary doctrine applied to all of the plaintiffs claims against AHP, including their claims under the
247
DTPA.
Further, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that public policy considerations require imposing a
248
duty to warn on AHP.
Since the plaintiffs did not see any of
AHP's Norplant advertisements before implantation, the court
did not directly address the issue concerning the applicability
of the learned intermediary doctrine when drug manufacturers
249
engage in direct-to-consumer advertising.
Notably, the court
mentioned in dictum that the learned intermediary doctrine
would likely apply even if the plaintiffs had seen the adver25o
tisements.
Finally, the court held that it should not carve
out another exception to the learned intermediary doctrine in
cases where the FDA requires warning labels, especially since
no such warnings were ever required for Norplant. 251
VI. CRITIQUE

The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit issued opinions in the lengthy Norplant Litigation that followed common
law precedent regarding failure to warn claims involving pre252
scription contraceptives.
Both courts appropriately applied
245
246
247
248
249
250
251

See at 379-380.
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375.
See id. at 378.
See id. at 379.
See id. at 379.
See id. at 379
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379-380.

252

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700
CE.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation r]. See also In re Norplant Contra-
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the learned intermediary doctrine to insulate AHP from a duty
to directly warn the plaintiffs of the risks inherent in using
253
However, both courts left unanswered the quesNorplant.
tion regarding whether the learned intermediary doctrine applies when pharmaceutical manufacturers engage in direct-to·· 254
consumer aver
d t Ismg.
A. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE SHOULD APPLY TO
NORPLANT BECAUSE A DOCTOR MUST SURGICALLY IMPLANT THE
DEVICE

Both the federal district court and Fifth Circuit correctly
rejected the plaintiffs' argument, based on Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories,255 that prescribing physicians do not play an active role in selecting Norplant as a patient's contraceptive
256
The plaintiffs argued that an exception to the
method.
learned intermediary doctrine should apply to Norplant prescriptions because, in Reyes, the Fifth Circuit created an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine when a defendant
manufacturer clearly knows that a physician does not adminis257
ter its vaccines.
Therefore, these physicians do not in fact
stand as learned intermediaries between the manufacturer
258
and those receiving its polio vaccines.
The physician-patient
relationship in Reyes, however, is distinguished from the physician-patient relationship in the Norplant Litigation where
the physicians actually participated in prescribing and im-

ceptive Products Liabiity Litigation, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation II"]
253

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 701. See also Norplant Litigation II,
165 F.3d at 380.
254

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 708. See also Norplant Litigation II,
165 F.3d at 379.
255

See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).

256

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707. See also Norplant Litigation II,
165 F.3d at 379.
257

See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277.

258

See id. The vaccine causing the plaintiffs infant daughter to contract polio was
dispensed by a nurse in a county health clinic without any warning of possible adverse
side effects. See id.
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259

planting Norplant.
Unlike that in Reyes, the existence of a
physician-patient relationship was undisputed in the Norplant
Litigation. 260
The plaintiffs argued that physicians played a diminished
role in prescribing the device because AHP distributed patient
261
information brochures through physicians.
However, unlike
the parents in Reyes, who received no warnings and had no
contact with a physician, AHP distributed brochures to physi262
cians who gave them to patients.
These brochures urged
women to discuss the risks and benefits of the device with
263
their doctors.
Further, physicians dispensed Norplant to the
plaintiffs only in the context of a physician-patient relation- .
ship, as evidenced by the fact that Norplant must be surgically
264
inserted.
For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit correctly affirmed the federal district court decision to apply the learned
intermediary doctrine to N orplant. 265
B. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE APPLIES TO
NORPLANT BECAUSE PRESCRIPTION CONTRACEPTIVES ARE
INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM OTHER PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

The Norplant Litigation plaintiffs argued that the unique
nature of prescription contraceptives warrants creating an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine. 266 The plaintiffs
relied primarily on MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp. 267 to support t h·
elr argument. 268 Th e MacD ona ld excep-

259
260

,

261
262
263

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 705.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

264
265

See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 705.

266

See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 707.

267

See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 711. See also Norplant Litigation II,
374 F.3d at 380.

,
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tion to the learned intermediary doctrine requires manufacturers of prescription contraceptives to provide warnings directly
to patients because physicians play a diminished role in prescribing these drugs to their patients. 269 However, both courts
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they should create an
exception to the doctrine under MacDonald, concluding that
the Massachusetts Supreme Court based its exception on
270
The federal district court decided not to
flawed reasoning.
follow the MacDonald exception to the learned intermediary
271
doctrine for the following reasons. First, MacDonald is not a
widely followed opinion and, thus, does not provide compelling
272
support for the plaintiffs' argument. Second, MacDonald did
not present a situation similar to the Norplant Litigation because the warnings AHP provided to physicians were adequate, undermining the basis for the MacDonald exception to
273
the doctrine.
Finally, an Eighth Circuit case, Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., further undermined the plaintiffs'
argument because it represents the majority view regarding
the continuing application of the doctrine to prescription con274
traceptives in United States jurisdictions. Thus, both courts
in the Norplant Litigation correctly followed the majority view
for applying the learned intermediary doctrine to failure to
warn claims as outlined in the Reaves opinion. 275

268
269

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 706.
See MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 69.

270

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707. See also Norplant Litigation II,
165 F.3d at 375.
271

272
273
274
275

See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 706-707.
See id. at 706.
See id. at 711.
See id. at 704.
See id. at 707.
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1. MacDonald Did Not Provide an Adequate Basis for the

Plaintiffs' Argument Because it is Not a Widely Followed Opin£on

The. Fifth Circuit correctly determined that the plaintiffs'
reliance on MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. was
276
misplaced.
The federal district court's analysis of the plaintiffs' argument began by emphasizing that no state or federal
court had adopted the MacDonald rationale for creating an
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for prescription
277
In
contraceptives in the twelve years following the decision.
MacDonald, the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply
because the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the
patient's active participation in the decision to use oral contraceptives diminished the role of the prescribing physician as a
learned intermediary.278 However, the courts in the Norplant
Litigation reasoned that they could draw no principled distinc279
tion between Norplant and other prescription drugs.
The
fact that a woman plays an active role in electing to use N orplant to prevent pregnancy does not diminish the physician's
role in determining each patient's suitability for using the de280
vice and counseling her as to its risks and benefits. As such,
the court correctly disagreed with the plaintiffs' diminished
role argument, noting that the fact that Norplant is elective
and other prescription drugs are therapeutic should not affect
281
the application of the learned intermediary doctrine.
Considering the court's reasoning that prescription contraceptives
such as Norplant are indistinguishable from other prescription
drugs, the plaintiffs' diminished role argument under Mac-

276

See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 706 (citing MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at

65).

277 See Norplant Litigation 1, 955 F. Supp. at 706.
278
See id.
279
See id. at 707.
280
See id. at 707.
281
See id. at 707
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Donald was particularly unpersuasive since a physician must
282
surgically implant the device.
2. Norplant's Warnings Were Adequate and Did Not Warrant
Imposing a Duty to Directly Warn the Plaintiffs' on AHP
The MacDonald facts differ from those in the Norplant Litigation in another crucial way.283 In the Norplant Litigation,
AHP clearly warned prescribing physicians of the common,
well-known, and reversible side effects that the plaintiffs al284
Conversely, in Macleged as a result of using Norplant.
Donald, the information booklet included with each pill dispenser warned of the risks of life threatening blood clotting in
some women, but failed to warn specifically of the possibility of
stroke. 285 MacDonald testified that she did not know that the
risk of blood clotting included this serious risk, and that she
286
would not have used the drug if she had known.
The MacDonald jury held the defendant manufacturer liable to MacDonald because its pills caused her injury and its failure to
adequately and directly warn MacDonald was the proximate
..
287
cause 0 fh er Injury.
In contrast, the product information booklet distributed to
N orplant users and their prescribing physicians clearly warned

282

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707.

283

See id. at 706 (citing MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 65).

284 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 374. Side effects suffered by the plaintiffs in the Norplant Litigation included severe headaches, mood swings, depression,
nausea, acne, arm pain, numbness, breast tenderness, weight gain, hair loss, cramps
and bleeding irregularities. See id. at 376. See also Defendant's No.2 Memorandum
in Support of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re Adequacy of the Norplant
Labeling at 3, Norplant Litigation, 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038).

285
See MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 67.
286
See id.
287

.

See id. at 72. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned that the jury's verdict on the inadequacy of the warnings was reasonable. In light of their common experience and MacDonald's testimony, the absence of reference to the word "stroke" in
the warning may have unduly minimized the warnings impact or failed to make the
nature of the risk reasonably comprehensible to the average consumer. See id. at 71.
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288

users of the side effects alleged by the plaintiffs.
For example, all five of the bellwether plaintiffs claimed they suffered
289
irregular menstrual bleeding. Moreover, AHP listed this risk
as the first potential adverse reaction in its Norplant patient
290
information materials.
Despite the risks, all five of the first
bellwether plaintiffs' prescribing physicians testified that they
received adequate warning of possible side effects and still believed that Norplant was a safe and effective product. 291 Unlike the defendant in MacDonald who received inadequate
warnings, AHP explicitly provided adequate warnings of potential side effects in its Norplant brochure. 292 Thus, since the
Norplant warnings to physicians were accurate, both courts
correctly determined that the learned intermediary doctrine
should apply to the plaintiffs' claims against AHP. 293

3. Both Courts Correctly Followed Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation Because it Represents the Majority View
The Norplant Litigation holding is further supported by
Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation. 294 In Reaves, the
plaintiff lost her leg as a result of a serious condition she de295
veloped while taking oral contraceptives.
Despite the severe
nature of her injury, the court in Reaves declined to create a

288 See also Defendant's No. 2 Memorandum in Support of Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment Re Adequacy of the Norplant Labeling, Norplant Litigation at 3,
955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (MDL 1038).
289

•

See id. at 12. Most of the women experienced irregular bleeding when using
Norplant. See id.
290

See id. at 12.

291 See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 710-711. Plaintiffs claimed that AHP
withheld information from physicians about Norplant side effects. The physicians
examined medical studies, Wyeth internal memoranda and letters that contained
information that was not available at the time they inserted Norplant into the plaintiffs. The physicians claimed that none of the new information would have changed
their minds about prescribing Norplant. See id.
292

See id. at 711.

293 See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 701. See also Norplant Litigation II,
165 F.3d at 375.

294
295

See Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
See id. at 1288.
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special exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for oral
contraceptives, finding the drugs indistinguishable from other
296
prescription drugs. The court held that the role of physicians
in prescribing contraceptives is identical to their role in prescribing other drugs, because with both types of drugs physicians play an active role in determining whether their patients
297
will be successful users of a particular product.
However, the Norplant Litigation presents a less persuasive
situation than Reaves for creating an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine. 298 In Reaves, the plaintiff became per299
manently disabled as a. result of using oral contraceptives.
The plaintiffs in the Norplant Litigation, however, alleged uncomfortable, but basically reversible side effects, including,
headaches, mood swings, depression, nausea, acne, arm pain,
numbness, breast tenderness, weight gain, hair loss, cramps
aoo
and menstrual cycle irregularities.
The Reaves court was
unwilling to create an exception to the doctrine, despite the
serious injuries Reaves suffered, because a physician still acted
301
as an learned intermediary when prescribing the drug.
Similarly, despite the numerous side effects alleged by the
plaintiffs, the courts in the Norplant Litigation concluded that
although prescription contraceptives are elective and have potentially serious side effects, these characteristics do not diminish the role of the prescribing physician as a learned intermediary.302 Therefore, the elective nature of Norplant does
not warrant placing a duty on manufacturers to directly warn
303
consumers of the device's inherent risks.
Both courts in the
Norplant Litigation correctly followed the majority view outlined in Reaves, as the applicability of the learned intermedi296
297
298
299

See id. at 1291.
.

See zd. at 1290.
..

.

See Norplant Lalgatlon II, 165 F.3d at 375.
See Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1288.

300
.
See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375.
301 See Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1291.
302
.
See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 707
303
See id.
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ary doctrine is determined according to role of prescribing phy304
sicians, and not by the severity of the alleged side effects.
C. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE SHOULD CONTINUE
TO APPLY WHEN PHARMACEUTICAL MANuFACTURERS
ADVERTISE PRODUCTS TO CONSUMERS

A few months after the Fifth Circuit determined that the
learned intermediary doctrine should apply to the plaintiffs'
claims in the Norplant Litigation, the New Jersey Supreme
Court specifically rejected the Norplant Litigation holding in
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. 305 The court in Perez held
that the learned intermediary doctrine should not shield a
pharmaceutical company from liability for failure to warn of
Norplant's risks since it engaged in direct-to-consumer adver306
tising.
The Perez majority concluded that direct-to-consumer
advertising undermines the very foundation of the learned in307
termediary doctrine.
The court based its conclusion on its
assumption that AHP's direct-to-consumer advertising of Norplant demonstrated that consumers participated directly in
their health care decisions, invalidating the premise that the
physician plays an active role in selecting a woman's contra30s
ceptive method.
Further, the court held that consumerdirected advertising infringes upon the patient-physician relationship by encouraging patients to ask for products by
309
name.
In addition, the court noted that consumer-directed
advertising undermines the view that prescription drugs and
devices and their potential adverse effects are too complex to
be effectively communicated to consumers.310 Conversely, if
presented with a legitimate claim involving the direct-to-

304
See id. at 701. See also Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 375.
305
See Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999).
306
See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1249.
307
See id. at 1256.

30S

309
310

See id.
See id.
See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256
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consumer advertising issue addressed in Perez, the courts in
the Norplant Litigation would have applied the learned inter311
mediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claims against AHP.
In the Norplant Litigation, the Fifth Circuit noted in dictum
that the learned intermediary doctrine should continue to apply when pharmaceutical manufacturers engage in direct-to312
The court based its statement on the
consumer advertising.
premise that the doctrine continues to apply as long as the
3l3
physician-patient relationship exists.
Throughout the Norplant Litigation opinions, the courts held contrary to Perez,
concluding that even if women make the ultimate decision
about their method of contraception, physicians still consistently advise patients of the various advantages and disadvan314
tages of a particular method.
The learned intermediary doctrine should 'continue to despite the fact that AHP engaged in direct-to-consumer advertising of Norplant, since physicians remain actively involved in
315
prescribing and implanting the device.
In the Norplant Litigation, the courts concluded that AHP's efforts to distribute
informational and promotional materials through physicians
did not undermine the applicability of the doctrine because,
despite these efforts, physicians played an active role in prescribing Norplant. 316 As such, the courts in the Norplant Litigation concluded that even if patients are actively involved in
choosing to use Norplant, the device is nevertheless only available by prescription and, therefore, physicians must be in317
In addition to
volved in the contraceptive selection process.
prescribing the device, physicians must surgically implant

311

.

See !d. at 1268.

312

See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379.

313
314

See id. at 379.

315

See Norplant Litigation I, 955 F. Supp. at 709.

316

See id. at 706.

317

See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d 374 at 379.

See id. at 379.
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318

Norplant under the skin of a woman's upper arm.
Consequently, even if the patient learned about Norplant from a
magazine advertisement, the prescribing physician remains
responsible for educating each patient about Norplant, assessing whether she will be a successful Norplant user, and
319
performing the surgical insertion procedure.
Further, like
the Norplant Litigation opinion, the dissenting opinion in
Perez concluded that even if the advertisements influenced a
woman's ultimate choice to use Norplant, the physician-patient
relationship remains implicit in prescribing the drug and per32o
Therefore, the reasoning
forming the surgical procedure.
presented in the Norplant Litigation, as the dissenting opinion
in Pere, correctly characterizes a physician's active involve321
ment in prescribing Norplant.
As such, if permitted to answer the question presented by AHP's direct-to-consumer
marketing campaign, the courts should have applied the
322
learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claim.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the application of the learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' failure to warn claims,
excusing AHP from the duty to directly warn Norplant users of
323
the possible risks of its product.
The court based its conclusion on the fact that prescribing physicians clearly played an
324
active role in prescribing and implanting the device.
Thus,

318
319
320

321
322

See id.
See id.
See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1268.
See Norplant Litigation, 165 F.3d at 379.
See id.

323

See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374,
380 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation II''}.
324

See id. at 379
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because the learned intermediary doctrine applied, the first
bellwether trial ended before it reached ajury.325
The decision reached by the federal district court and the
Fifth Circuit in the Norplant Litigation were consistent with
326
the common law of most United States jurisdictions.
These
decisions to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to the
plaintiffs' claims reinforces the position of pharmaceutical
companies with regard to their duty to directly warn consumers of the side effects of prescribed products. 327 Simply stated,
the rule remains that if a pharmaceutical company provides
adequate warnings to physicians who prescribe its drugs, it is
not directly liable to consumers for failure to warn of the risks
328
inherent in using their products.
Although AHP admits no fault or responsibility for the
plaintiffs' suffering, it is attempting to end this long and expensive litigation by settling with the plaintiffs in the Norplant
Litigation. 329 It remains unclear as of this writing whether all
of the plaintiffs involved in the Norplant Litigation will agree
330
to settle their claims against AHP.
Until the uncertainty

325 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 955 F. Supp.
700, 711 (E.D. Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Norplant Litigation r}. See also Norplant
Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 380.
326 See Norplant Litigation 1,955 F. Supp. at 707 (citing Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Terhune v. AH. Robins Co., 90
Wash 2d 9 (1978); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988);
Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A2d 398 (Del. 1989); MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775
F. Supp. 417 (D. D.C. 1991); Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989);
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988); West v. Searle &
Co., (304 Ark. 33 (1991); Martin v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 169 Ill.2d 234 (1996);
Humes v. Clinton, 246 Kan. 590 (1990».
327 See Norplant Litigation II, 165 F.3d at 379.

328
329

•

See Id. at 376.
.

See Charles Orstem, Norplant company agrees to settle suits, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6, 1999. Each plaintiff should receive around $1,500 less
attorney's fees.
330 See Order Establishing Schedule for Responses of Non-Settling Plaintiffs, In re
Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, MD 1038.
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regarding the applicability of the learned intermediary doctrine to failure to warn claims against pharmaceutical companies is eliminated, complex and expensive litigation such as
that involving Norplant will continue to address these issues.

Stacey Leffler Ravetta*

this article. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their unconditional
love and support in all that I do. Last but not least, a special thank you to my husband, Paul Ravetta, for always holding my hand and encouraging me to do what
makes me happy.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

47

